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I. I N T R O D U C T I O N 
There is a great deal of descriptive material availabl on the hardships 
endured by the millions
1
 of people who have been forcibly resettled under 
the Nationalist government's resettlement programme over the past 30 years. 
Particular attention was given to the matter in the late 1950's and early 
1960
1
s by the Liberal Party; later the cause was taken up with admirable 
zeal by the Black Sash, the English Press and others. Public awareness 
and concern probably reached its height with the detailed exposes of 
conditions under which people were removed to Limehill in January 1968. 
Much of this material, however, is concerned solely with the actual process 
of resettlement and with the lack of facilities immediately after the 
removals. There has been no study of the long-term effects of resettle-
ment; nor has any analysis been made which supplies an adequate theoretical 
explanation of the process in all its forms. 
This article is concerned primarily with an empirical case study of the 
longer term effects of resettlement, but, secondly, we intend to show that 
these facts, taken together with other empirical research on resettlement 
and on African unemployment
2
, demonstrate that, on the one hand, the 
Nationalists' policy cannot be explained in purely ideological terms, 
but neither, on the other, can the practice be fitted into a rigid, pre-
conceived, deterministic and economistic framework which excludes 
political and ideological factors. 
II. CONTEXT OF THE SURVEY 
In his study of the resettlement policy Baldwin
3
 lists 'six categories of 
forced removals', namely: 
1. Removals from the rural areas which result from the elimination of 
squatting and labour tenancies on white farms and the eradication 
of B1ack spots
1
 ; 
2. The removal of urban townships and the resettling of their inhabitants 
in a reserve township; 
3. A larger scale form of (2) which is centred on three major industrial 
areas: Pretoria, Durban and East London; 
4. The removal of people in the Cape living to the west of the 'Kat/Fish' 
1 ine; 
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5. Removals for the purpose of consolidating the 'homelands'; 
6. Endorsements out of urban areas. 
7. To these can be added a seventh, which is the removal of people to 
new sites within the 'homelands' in the interests of so-called 
'betterment schemes'.
4 
The people are moved to various types of settlement, namely: 
(a) 'self-contained Bantu towns in homelands'
 5
. People in categories 
2 and 3 above and possibly some from category 6 are moved to such'towns'. 
The purpose of these towns is primarily to serve the labour needs of 
border industries. 
(b) 'towns in the homelands with rudimentary services and housing'. 
These are intended for people in categories 4, 6 and some from 1; they 
are meant to house the families of migrant workers. 
(c) 'densely populated residential areas of 1/16 to 1/8 morgen'. Most 
of those in category 1 are resettled in such places, which are known as 
'closer settlements'. These are meant to house the groups of the 
population extruded from 'white' rural areas. 
(d) 'On suitable Trust land where families are settled on a system of 
controlled squatting'. Some from category 1 are resettled in such places 
(a few, who had 20 morgen or more in 'black spots', as farmers), but they 
are usually related to the 'betterment schemes' i.e. they house those who 
have been rendered landless as a result of the Nationalists' attempt to 
establish a stable class of relatively rich peasants in the 'homelands'. 
The people resettled at Limehill fell under category 1 and the settle-
ment is of type (c), where, according to the official Circular, 'Normally 
only a rudimentary layout on the basis of agricultural residential areas 
is undertaken'. 
The layout at Limehill in 1968 was certainly 'rudimentary': plots marked 
off with pegs, a pile of tents and a water tank in the distance. That 
was all. But this was in accord with the official regulations and Limehill 
was no different in this respect from dozens of other 'closer settlements' 
that are scattered throughout the country. 
3/ 
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III. THE SURVEY 
Limehill was chosen as the subject of this study because the history of 
the settlement and the background of the people involved wP
 n
 well 
known to us personally and have been well documented. The timing of 
the survey was influenced by the fact that 29th January 197 marks 
the tenth anniversary of the first removals from Meran to Limehill. 
The study was undertaken in collaboration with the Development Studies 
Research Group of the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, who were 
responsible for drawing up the questionnaires, providing guidelines for 
the interviewer and assisting with the tabulation and analysis of the 
responses. A full-time interviewer, who has had considerable experience 
in similar field research, spent five weeks at Limehill in December 1977 -
January 1978 interviewing individual representatives of 101 households 
and filling in a questionnaire in respect of each. Households were 
selected at the discretion of the interviewer. The respondents were 
asked in the course of the interview who they considered the most 
important people in the community to be. Ten of those most frequently 
mentioned were then interviewed using a different questionnaire. 
The number of households covered by the survey represents approximately 
one-third of all those moved to Limehill in 1968/9; those who have been 
resettled there more recently were excluded. 
The main difficulty experienced by the interviewer was overcoming the 
fear and suspicion of the respondents. 'What I have found is that people 
are living in fear of the Security Police and of "communists" . Some 
people threatened to call the police when I asked them questions. They 
said they had been told that there were some people opposed to the 
government, called "communists", going around and that if they saw one 
they should report to the police'. 
In evaluating the effects of the resettlement at Limehill and the findings 
of this study it should be borne in mind that the people concerned did 
not come from impoverished, broken-down communities. They were from stable, 
well-established communities and were relatively prosperous compared, 
for example, to many of those removed from white farms. Virtually all 
of them had land and cattle and many were able to do occasional work in 
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Wasbank to supplement the income from their migrant workers. The fact 
that they were a healthy, prosperous community, (many of them had savings 
to fall back on), probably accounts for their surviving as well as they 
have done. 
Further, the survey was confined to Limehill itself and did not cover 
the whole resettlement complex comprising Uitval, Vaalkop and Vergelegen -
see the map) which is sometimes referred to as 'Limehil
1
'. The outbreak 
of typhoid and gastro-enteritis which claimed over 70 lives from November 
1968 to January 1969 affected other places, notably Uitval, more than 
Limehill itself. 
IV. GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
Our interviewer, who has been familar with the settlement since its 
establishment, reported, 'There is very little improvement at Limehill. 
The only new thing is that they built an office'. This office, however, 
was unable to furnish him with accurate population figures for the 
settlement. 
There are now approximately 350 houses, of which about 40 are occupied 
by more recent residents. The average family size was found by the 
survey to be 5,3, which gives an estimated total population of 1850. 
The original residents have now completed building their own houses. 
It took them on average 3 years to do so, with 5% taking 6 years. The 
vast majority of the houses are built of mud (83%) a few of blocks (14%) 
and even fewer of bricks (3%); roofing is of thatch (63%) or corrugated 
iron (37%). 
Many of the mud houses are showing considerable signs of wear and tear. 
This is attributed to the fact that the people were forced to build in 
an exposed place and thus the houses have no protection from the wind 
and the rain and the presence of termites in the soil. 
The dirt 'road' that runs through the middle of the settlement is pot-
holed and corrugated, while some of the side 'streets' are now completely 
overgrown. There is thus a general air of delapidation, desolation and 
isolation about the place. Limehill is about 5 kilometres from the next 
part of the complex and there are vast tracts of empty land on all sides. 
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The people removed to Limehill were not allowed to take their cattle, 
but cattle from a nearby tribally owned area of Tholeni graze freely 
on this land. 
Facilities may be described as follows: 
Water is obtained from taps in the 'streets', though by no means in 
every 'street'. We were able to locate only 10 taps in the whole settle-
ment, i.e. one tap to serve 35 families. 
According to the official regulations, people in closer settlements are 
'expected to instal their own cess-pit latrines.' This they did at the 
beginning but these have now been replaced with corrugated iron privies 
which are serviced by a bucket system. There were several complaints 
about the number of flies that this process attracts. (It might be true 
that they had even more primitive toilet arrangements in their previous 
residences, but there the houses were much further apart). 
There is now a clinic with a resident nurse, but no doctor. Since there 
is no phone and no ambulance the nurse has no means of communicating with 
a hospital or a doctor in an emergency. Private doctors hold surgeries 
at the clinic. The fees are: 
30 cents for a visit to the nurse 
R2 for a visit to the doctor 
R5 for childbirth 
There are two primary schools, which also serve other parts of the complex. 
The main problem is overcrowded classes. One teacher, for example, is 
responsible for 120 children in a double session. 
There are two general dealers and one cafe/store. These have limited 
stocks and, owing to transport costs, prices are higher than in the towns. 
Nevertheless most people (94%) do at least some of their shopping in 
Limehill, since the high cost of bus fares makes it uneconomical to go 
to Ladysmith, Dundee or Wasbank except for major shopping. 
The fares are: 
Ladysmith - R1,80 return 
Dundee - R1,10 return 
Wasbank - R0,70 return 
Three church buildings have been erected: by the Dutch Reformed Church, 
the Bantu Presbyterian Church and the Methodist Church. The Roman Catholic 
Church has applied for but not yet succeeded in obtaining a site. 
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V. RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRES 
1. Arrivals and departures 
88 of those interviewed arrived at Limehill in 1968 and the o":er 13 in 1969. 
They came from Maria Ratschitz Mission (52) Meran (32) Evansdale (15) and 
Van Steyl (2). Those coming from Maria Ratschitz are probably somewhat 
overrepresented in the survey sample. 
All these places are considerably nearer to the neighbouring 'White' towns 
of Was'bank, Dundee arid Ladysmith than Limehill is. 
11% of the children who were aged 5 years or less at the time of the removal 
are now dead. 
Some young people have gone, either as individuals or as family units, to 
settle elsewhere - presumably illegally; others have simply 'disappeared' 
and their families have no knowledge of their whereabouts. The figures for 
the 101 families interviewed are given in the following table; the total 
of 68 constitutes 14% of the original population. 
TABLE I 
DEPARTURES FROM SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS 1968-1977 
Age at time of arrival 
Under 15 1 5 - 2 4 25 - 49 over 50 Total 
Died 14 4 15 33 
Emigrated 2 2 6 - 10 
Di sappeared 1 6 3 1 11 
Married - 12 2 - 14 
Total 17 20 15 16 68 
14/ 
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2. Present population 
(i) Children born at Limehill 
As the following table shows, almost 20% of the children born at Limehill 
have not survived until the survey date. If children born in the last two 
years, who have not yet survived the danger period for infant mortality, are 
excluded, the percentage is slightly higher at 23%. This is considerably 
lower than the infant mortality rate in some 'homeland' areas, where it is 
estimated that 40% of children born do not reach the age of five. But there 
is no reason for judging Limehill by this norm. As has been mentioned, 
the people at Limehill were not from an impoverished community and, although 
their standard of living is falling, they have not yet sunk to the same 
level of deprivation that prevails in some 'homeland' areas. The mortality 
rate, which is excessively high by any civilised standards, takes on an 
added significance in the light of the low total number of births. 
TABLE II 
CHILDREN BORN AT LIMEHILL 1968-1977 (SAMPLE ONLY) 
1968/69 
Alive Dead 
1970/71 
Alive Dead 
1972/73 
Alive Dead 
1974/75 
Alive Dead 
1976/77 
Alive Dead 
- r 
Total 
Alive Dead Grand 
Total 
Male 
Female 
9 4 
3 3 
17 2 
4 4 
10 4 
5 1 
9 2 
17 3 
7 1 
17 0 
52 13 65 
46 11 57 
Total 12 7 21 6 15 5 26 5 24 1 98 24 122 
Deaths : 19,7%. 
17/ 
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(i i) Present population 
The high mortality rate and the low birth rate have produced an obvious 
imbalance in the present composition of the population. Choreas one would expect 
the 0-10 age group in any community to be the largest of all ten year old 
cohorts, in Limehill this group is considerably smaller than the 11-20 age 
group - i.e. those who were 0-10 at the time of the removal. (In other respects, 
the distribution of people by age follows the usual 'pyramidal
1
 shape, as 
Table III shows). 
TABLE III 
PRESENT POPULATION (SAMPLE ONLY) 
Age Male Female Total 
0-10 52 46 98 
11-20 83 84 167 
21-30 31 43 74 
31-40 34 27 61 
41-50 27 26 53 
51-60 21 22 43 
> 60 10 21 31 
Totals 258 269 527 
Average family size 5,3 
No figures on the mortality rates in the former places of residence are 
available. But it can be established that either the mortality rate was 
considerably lower and/or the birth rate considerably higher, since the 
ratio of children under 10 to women in the child-bearing are group (assumed 
to be all those between 16 and 50) in 1977 was half what it had been in 
1968/69. 
26/ 
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TABLE IV 
LIVE CHILDREN PER FEMALE BETWEEN 16 AND 50 1968/9 AND 1977. 
(SAMPLE ONLY) 
1968/9 1977 
Number of live children 0-10 167 98 
Number of women 16-20 21 42 
Number of women 21-30 27 43 
Number of women 31-40 26 27 
Number of women 41-50 22 26 
96 138 
Add departures 20 
116 
Live children 0-10 per female 
between 16-50 
1,44 0,71 
> .. . 
(i i i) Growth Rate 
The annual rate of growth for the Zulu population group for the years 
1970-1977 was 2,7%®. In Limehill, over the past ten years, it was at most 
half of this; i.e. if one assumes that all those who have emigrated, married 
or disappeared are still living. 
TABLE V 
GROWTH IN LIMEHILL AND CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL POPULATION GROWTH. 
Origi nal 
population 
Add 1ive children born 
at Limehill 
Less (i) total depart-
ures 
(ii) deaths only 
Now 
Increase 
Annual rate of increase 
Growth in Limehill 
(sample 
497 
98 
68 
Contribution to national 
population growth. 
figures) 
497 
98 
33 
527 
30 
0,6% 
562 
65 
1,2% 
17/ 
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The high mortality and other departures are not sufficient to explain this 
extremely low growth rate. Other contributory factors are : 
(a) Inter-natal deaths: Seven respondents mentioned that the major problem 
at Limehill was the absence of doctors to assist at childbirth. Consequently, 
they said, mothers and/or children die. Yet, according to Cu. interviewer, 
none of the respondents who had lost children mentioned still 'jorn children 
or ones who had died at birth. He noted that many of the^e children are 
buried immediately at home and not taken to the graveyard and he thought that 
most people would not think of including them among their children who had died. 
This was confirmed by others. And a doctor who has worked in rural areas 
said that people tend to forget not only about babies who die at birth but 
also those who live for only a couple of months. 
(b) Birth control: The clinic, assisted by Radio Bantu and other government 
agencies, is actively promoting family planning. 
In view of the impoverished conditions at Limehill it is likely that more 
people would be willing to practise birth control than would have been at 
their previous residences. 
(c) Many of the residents believe that the beer which is sold in stores is 
doctored in order to suppress sexual desire. It is of some significance that 
people are prepared to believe this, but I am authoritatively informed that 
it is impossible to introduce a drug which would have this effect, without 
also endangering life. 
The first and most obvious conclusion, therefore, to emerge from this survey 
is that, whatever the precise reasons and whatever moral, sociological or 
ecological judgement one might wish to pass on it, the resettlement of people 
at Limehill has drastically curbed the natural increase of population. 
3. School attendance and employment 
The one positive fact to emerge from the survey was that those children who manage 
to survive do attend school. Only 5 children out of 104 in the 6 - 1 4 age group 
were not attending school. 
(i) Unemployment 
Unemployment in Limehill, particularly among women, is considerably higher 
than the national average. In Johannesburg in mid-1977 male African unemploy-
ment was estimated at 28%
7
. In Limehill at the end of the year it was over 34%. 
1 2 / . 
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And this is so, even though a large proportion of those in the 15-24 age group 
were still at school; probably, in many cases, because they had nothing else 
to do. 
TABLE VI 
MALE UNEMPLOYMENT 
Age group employed unemployed at school unable to work 
15-19 2 7 34 -
20-24 7 11 8 -
25-34 19 7 - -
35-44 27 6 - 1 
45-64 26 11 - 1 
Totals 81 42 42 2 
Total 167 
Economically 
active 123 
Unemployment 
rate 34,2% 
It is noticeable that unemployment is at its highest among those who have 
reached the age for entering the labour market while resident at Limehill, 
i.e. the 15-24 age group. 
The position among women is even worse. Although it is difficult to establish 
precisely how many women want to work and therefore how many may be classified 
as 'unemployed', it is significant that in Johannesburg in mid-1977 47% of 
African women over the age of 16 were in employment
8
 , whereas at Limehill 
of those in the 15-64 age group only 13% were employed. 
13/ 
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TABLE VII 
FEMALE EMPLOYMENT 
Age group employed not employed at school undDie to work 
15-19 0 2 32 -
20-24 4 14 5 -
25-34 7 32 - -
35-44 9 21 - -
45-64 1 32 - 4 
Totals 21 101 37 4 
The number of women who could be expected to be economically active (based 
on national figures for African women) has been calculated as follows, 
(Following Simkins
 9
) : 
TABLE VIII 
FEMALE UNEMPLOYMENT 
Age group economically 
active (Simkins) 
total in 
age group 
expected 
number econom-
ically active 
actually 
eTnployed 
r - " 
'unemployed
1 
20-24 66 23 15 4 11 
25-34 49 39 19 7 12 
35-44 39 30 12 9 3 
45-64 30 37 11 1 10 
Totals 57 21 36 
Total 163 
Economically 
active 57 
Unemployment 
rate 63% 
14/ 
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(ii) Distribution of earners 
} 
The above tables show that there are 102 wage earners, which is one for 
every household of 5,3 people. The National average in 1977 was one wage 
earner for every 3,7 people
1 0
. 
15 households have no wage earner at all. 74 have one - sometimes a female 
member of the family - 9 have 2; 2 have 3; and one has 4. 
(iii) Places of work 
There never has been, and there is not, any intention on the part of the 
government to provide employment opportunities in or near Limehill. The nearest 
border industry area is Ladysmith, from where they have been moved further 
away . Limehill is just over 50 kms from the Ladysmith border industries. 
In any event, these border industries draw their labour primarily from 
Ezakheni, which was established for that purpose and is much closer. It is 
only 17 kms away and this distance will be shortened when the proposed tar 
road directly linking the township with the border industries has been built. 
Ezakheni presently has a population of some 45 000 and the proposed population 
is 80 000. It is most unlikely that these industries will ever develop to 
such an extent that their labour needs will not be met from this population. 
Even if they do,the next logical place to draw labour from is the new 
'township' of Ekuvukeni (or Zandbult), which is 20 kms nearer to Ladysmith 
than Limehill is and into which thousands of people are presently be in Iff moved. 
None of those interviewed were employed in Limehill itself. 2 were employed 
by the Kwazulu government in Uitval, about 5 kms away, and 1 in the tribally 
owned area of Tholeni, about 5 kms away in the opposite direction. For the 
rest, 58% of the men were long-term migrant workers in Johannesburg, Durban, 
Pretoria, Vryheid, Newcastle and Estcourt; the other 38% were daily or weekly 
commuters to Wasbank, Dundee or Ladysmith. One of the women was a long-term 
migrant worker; the others commuted to the towns mentioned. (Those who 
commute to Ladysmith leave at 5 a.m. and return between 6 p.m. and 7 p.m. 
Many, therefore, 'prefer' to return home only at weekends). 
There is a considerable amount of confusion among Limehill residents about 
the procedures to be followed in finding work. It appears that there is a 
labour bureau in Uitval, to which those desiring employment must report in 
15/ . 
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the first instance. Relatively few (if any) people actually get work through 
the Uitval bureau; in most cases, permission is required from it for people 
to register with the Ladysmith labour bureau. This permission is often withheld, 
reportedly with remarks like 'go and ask Kwazulu for a job'. 
Under such circumstances, older workers probably fare better than younger ones, 
the former managing to sign up for.new contracts with firms that had employed 
them before resettlement. Legal access to work appears much more restricted 
for the young. 
4. Local authority. 
Limehill forms part of Kwazulu and the local administration is in the hands 
of a chief and his councillors, all of whom are appointed. There appears to 
be some confusion, however, on the respective roles of Ulundi and Pretoria. 
It is not unusual, I was told, for the reply to a matter referred to Ulundi 
to come from Pretoria and vice versa. 
There are three different groups of police operating in the area; the 
Kwazulu police, the chief's police, and the South African police. 
Those interviewed were virtually unanimous in stating that they had no say 
in decisions affecting the community. 2 out of 101 said that they did 
participate in decision making; one of these noted that he was a councillor. 
79 replied that being part of Kwazulu, as opposed to being directly under 
Pretoria, had made no difference to them. 
22 claimed that being part of Kwazulu had made a difference. However, this 
claim was based more on promises which they said the Kwazulu government had 
made than on anything which had been done-. Some respondents gave more than 
one example of the difference Kwazulu had made: 
Had supplied water 
Was going to build a secondary 
school 
Was going to provide land 
Other 
6 
13 
3 
6 
26/ 
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5. Problems experienced and their possible solutions 
The most frequently mentioned problem was the absence of job opportunities 
and the distance from places of possible employment - 45 times. Only 
fractionally less frequent were such stark; statements as 'hunger
1
, 'poverty' 
'we have no food' - 44 times. 
10 just mentioned the lack of land, but many also mentioned this as the reason 
for their hunger, etc. Other problems mentioned were: 
Moral problems - delinquency, broken marriages, etc. 19 
Absence of doctors 7 
Unsatisfactory water supply 4 
No secondary school 2 
Unsatisfactory facilities - shops, road, etc. 8 
83 of those interviewed either did not know what progress to expect in solving 
these problems or did not think that they would be solved. Some added that 
they thought conditions could only become worse. 
The Kwazulu government provided the only ray of hope for some respondents: 
2 thought it would provide land 
1 that it would improve facilities 
11 that it would 'do something'. 
The other 4 hoped for such unlikely events as the provision of job opportunities. 
6. Opinion of life at Limehill 
3 respondents described life at Limehill as 'good'; another 4 considered it 
'fair'. 
The vast majority described it as a 'place of suffering', 'a land of sorrows', 
(34) a bad and difficult place to live in, (19) as causing increased depriva-
tion, (23). 
One respondent commented: 'I do not think there is anyone who does not know 
that Limehill is a place of suffering'. Another: 'Life at Limehill is half-prison'. 
A more biblically-minded person:'Life at Limehill is half Egypt for us'. 
'Limehill is the land of the outcast people and we feel it'. 
A further 10 described the life as 'breaking us down'; and they considered 
that this was being done of set purpose. The population statistics given in 
the earlier tables add some substance perhaps to such comments as: 'Life at 
Limehill is to me a sign of what is the aim of the government to us Blacks, 
because he moved us to this place so that we may suffer till we die'. 'Life 
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at Limehill is bad and everybody knows that it was meant for that - that we 
should suffer'. 'Limehill is destroying our people'. 
3 respondents described the life as causing 'stagnation'; 3 others gave not 
entirely relevant comments and 2 questionnaires were incomplete. 
In the light of the above it is not surprising that 84 respondents said that 
they would return to their former place of residence if given the opportunity; 
14 said they would not; 2 questionnaires were incomplete. 
The breakdown of the answers to the previous question shows that there were 
not 14 people who were enjoying life at Limehill. There must, therefore, be 
other reasons for their not wanting to leave. As one such respondent explained 
he 'had no hope that to go back would help him now and that the only thing 
he wants is to die and not to try anything, because whatever a Black man is 
saying it will become a source of death
1
. 
Virtually all the reasons for wanting to return to their former residences 
were related to the fact that they had had land and cattle in those places. 
Some mentioned this explicitly while others who said they were 'happier' 
or 'more prosperous' in the former places explained that this was because 
they were not entirely dependent on cash income or because they did not have 
'to buy everything, including firewood
1
. 
The answer to these last two questions explode the myth - if it still needed 
exploding - propagated by, among others, the Minister of Bantu Administration 
and Development, M.C. Botha, that 'the Bantu people like being moved'
 1 1
 and 
the even more popular myth that once the initial hardships have been overcome 
the people adapt to their new life and prefer it to their old way of life. 
There has been no effort on the part of the government noticeably to improve 
the conditions at Limehill over the past ten years. For Limehill there are 
Reasons: 
Happier in the old place 
Had land/cattle 
Were richer 
Lived more like people 
CIimate 
29 
35 
10 
9 
2 
85 
18/ 
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no plans even on paper for the provision of further facilities as is the case 
for Ezakheni and Ekuvukeni - though even there they are still very much at 
the paper stage. Any development that is taking place or which is planned 
is centred on those townships that will serve the border industries. The 
people themselves appear to lack both the will and the means to make any progress. 
This survey, we believe, confirms the conclusion that we will expand upon below 
that the people of Limehill and similar places belong to 'a social category 
of dispossessed and broken individuals superfluous to and discarded by the 
system which created them'.
1 2 
VI COMMUNITY LEADERS 
In reply to the question on who they considered the most important members 
of the community to be, the respondents referred to categories of people -
usually two or three - rather than to individuals. The most frequently 
mentioned were : 
5 councillors, 2 teachers, 2 shopkeepers and the nurse were interviewed. 
(No minister of religion was available). 
The purpose of the questionnaire was to ascertain their perception of the life 
and problems of Limehill and of what progress could be made to see if these 
differed from those of the 'ordinary people'. 
They tended to view the problems from the point of view of their own particular 
interest. Thus the teachers were concerned about overcrowded classes, the 
shopkeepers with their low profit margin, and the councillors with the 
difficulty of maintaining law and order. One, a minister's wife, thought 
that she and other Church members could do something to provide health education 
and to improve the moral fibre of the community. The others, however, did 
not see anything they could do, but placed their hopes in the Kwazulu 
government and/or Inkatha and the African Chamber of Commerce. 
Councillors 
Ministers/priest 
Teachers 
Shopkeepers 
Nurse 
46 
42 
22 
14 
73 times 
-23/. 
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The most striking fact was the frequency with which Inkatha was mentioned 
by community leaders. None of the 101 respondents to the previous questionnaires 
referred to Inkatha members as such as being among the most important members 
of the community, nor did they express any hope that Inkatha would bring 
about an improvement of their condition. Of the community leaders, however, 
six of whom were members of Inkatha, 5 listed members of Inkatha among the 
most important people; 4 considered Inkatha to be the most likely organisation 
to help solve the community's problems; and 6 looked to Inkatha for the solution 
to their own problems. This doubtless says something about Inkatha, but that 
is not our concern here. 
VII INTERPRETATION 
This survey shows that the long term effects of the Nationalist government's 
resettlement policy are no less dehumanising and demoralising than the initial 
suffering and hardship inflicted when people are uprooted from their established 
homes and dumped in the barren veld. The position does not improve with time. 
People die and those who live become poorer and poorer and more without grounds 
for hope. The purpose of the survey, however, is not simply to rekindle the 
moral outrage which was aroused among government opponents when the inhuman 
conditions at Limehill were first exposed. Such outrage, while it is 
understandable and necessary, does not help us to understand the policy and 
what it will take to change it. 
Until fairly recently, most commentators on the South African social, political 
and economic scene were content simply to describe and denounce the evil effects 
of Nationalist policy. If any explanation at all was sought, this was located 
in the irrational and immoral desire of the Nationalists for racial separation 
as a means of maintaining their own ethic purity. This, of course, provides 
no explanation at all, either of the apartheid policy in general or the 
resettlement policy in particular, for, as Johnstone in particular has pointed 
out, to say that people practise racial discrimination because they are racists 
is simply tautologous
 1 3
. 
Radicals, on the other hand, tend to dismiss all ideological factors and 
attempt to fit the 'facts' into rather rigidly preconceived theoretical 
frameworks. Much of the debate then centres around the conceptualisation 
of problems; less attention is paid to new empirical analysis. Indeed, 
many of the 'facts' adduced by these authors are somewhat oversimplified, 
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even on occasion false. The general drift of the analysis might well be 
sound, despite the factual errors; at best, the details would need to be 
reformulated, while, at worst, people might take inaccuracies as grounds for 
rejecting the validity of the whole analysis. 
Morris, for example, has shown that Lipton assumed that she had rebutted 
Wolpe's analysis
 1 4
 simply by demonstrating that his factual claim that 
African real wages had not risen was false
 l s
. There are two further assertions 
relevant to our study, made by Wolpe,which need to be criticised. The first 
is related to the absorptive capacity of border industries. He asserts that 
'between 1960 and 1968 approximately 100 000 Africans were employed 
in these industries which were absorbing 30% of Africans entering jobs each 
year by 1969'.
1 6
 A source for these statistics is not cited, but they appear 
to be too high. Bell cites statistics of the Permanent Committee for the 
Location of Industry and the Development of Border Areas to the effect that 
employment in 'border and Bantu areas' increased by 87 000 over the period 
1960 to 1970 and goes on to argue that even this figure is probably on over-
estimate
 1 7
. The second relates to the cost of living in the 'homelands'. 
'Not only, as has already been indicated, in the level of subsistence extremely 
low in the homelands', but in addition there are virtually no urban areas 
which might tend to increase this level. The assessment by the State, employers 
organisations and so on, of African subsistence requirements in the Reserves 
is much lower than in the main industrial centres'
 1 8
. The assessment may 
be much lower, but it is wrongly so, at least at a place like Limehill, since 
the cost of living is higher there. This is principally because the cost of 
transporting the necessities of life from urban areas is high and this gets 
reflected in prices at local stores. This is not pointed out, and it makes 
a difference to a more central part of Wolpe's argument. He claims that 
apartheid 'can best be understood as the mechanism specific to South Africa 
in the period of secondary industrialisation, of maintaining a high rate of 
capitalist exploitation through a system which guarantees a cheap and controlled 
labour force'
 1 9
. Wolpe's explanation of the cheapening of labour in the 
'early period' by the use of migrant workers who maintained a subsistence base 
in the precapitalist mode of production makes sense. But how, for example, 
does the removal of people from a place where they did have a subsistence 
base, to a place which is further away from border industries and where the 
cost of living is. higher cheapen the cost of labour? Those who were previously 
migrants remain migrants, but now they have additional expenses to meet. 
Migratory labour is not in itself necessarily cheap; it would appear, for 
12/. 
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example, that educational qualification have at least as much effect on 
the reserve price which people place on their labour as their place of 
residence does
 2 0
. 
Legassick, too, appears to be out of touch when he writes 'The creation 
'from above' of capitalist relations of production in agriculture has been 
completed only in the 1960's with the eviction of the last labour tenants 
in Natal and the Transvaal'
 2 1
. If the creation of capitalist relations 
of production depends on the eviction of all labour tenants, the process 
was most certaiinly not completed in the 1960's and it still has a long way 
to go. Whether or not farmers retain labour tenants, as many still do, 
at least in Natal, seems to depend more on their political affiliations 
and their relations with local authorities than on their particular mode 
of agricultural production. 
A final example : Morris says that 'apartheid is a system of ensuring an 
adequate distribution of labour by means of state bureaucratic intervention 
rather than the operation of a "free" labour market. The two prime elements 
in this system have been influx controls and a system of national labour 
bureaux. The purpose of influx controls it would seem ...is in fact not to 
expel Africans from White areas but to organise and rationalise the 
distribution of African labour within a complexly structured economy'
 2 2
. 
In support of his explanation of influx controls he quotes official statements 
of just the sort which radical authors usually dismiss as 'ideological'. 
In fact, the vast majority of the victims of influx control are simply 
packed off - sometimes under police escort - to their de facto or de jure 
'homelands'. They are sent to 'closer settlements' and rural 'townships' 
where there is no labour shortage. Influx controls doubtless do rationalise 
the distribution of labour, but they also do far more than that. 
Morris continues 'the labour bureau system has also been a means to cut down 
wasted labour time ... they are obviously effective as labour distribution 
centres'
 2 3
, presumably likewise in a 'complexly structured economy'. But 
are they? A survey of 900-odd unemployed people in Durban, Johannesburg and 
Pietermaritzburg showed that in the former two cities, registration at labour 
bureaux as a means of finding employment took third place to 'asking employed 
relatives and friends' and 'visiting potential employers'. 
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In Pietermaritzburg, however, 'the overwhelming majority expect to find work 
through the labour bureau and the intensity of the search (as measured by 
the average number of ways in which people look for work) is much lower. 
This raises the interesting possibility that in a relatively undifferentiated 
labour market (as we have seen Pietermaritzburg to be ) the labour bureau 
either functions better as an agency for placing people in employment or 
that workseekers are more constrained to use it; the corollary would be that 
'labour direction' techniques will be less successful as African employment 
becomes more occupationally differentiated'
 2 k
. 
None of these authors, as far as I am aware, have given a comprehensive 
analysis of the resettlement policy, although many refer to it in passing. 
Such analysis as is supplied, however, does not provide an adequate explanation 
of the policy in all its forms. The most comprehensive recent study is that 
of Baldwin, who concludes: 'At one level the reason for such massive upheavals 
described above is the pursuit of an ideological goal, that of separate 
development. But that policy itself is not so much concerned with racial 
separation as with maintaining the system of white domination and super-
exploitation of blacks. The present Nationalist government sees this aim 
as being least pursued through separate development, a policy which necessitates 
the forced removals'
 2 5
. 
This conclusion is rejected by Morris who writes: 'Contrary to Baldwin's 
claim that mass removals are the implementation of the "ideological demand 
for race separation", their analysis can (indeed must) be grounded in the 
qualitative changes taking place in capitalist agriculture. Forced removals 
and resettlement, as an aspect of apartheid, are the social form of the 
extrusion of labour from this branch of production'
 2 6
. 
Morris was quoting from an earlier version of Baldwin's paper which might have 
differed from the published version. But if Baldwin's analysis is not entirely 
adequate, neither is Morris'. Baldwin was dealing with almost _aJJ_ forms of 
resettlement, whereas Morris' suggested analysis can only possibly be applied 
to one part of the process - a part which accounts for possibly 40% of the 
removals*and even then it does not explain the precise form of their 
resettlement. The capitalisation of agriculture has undoubtedly created a 
large 'surplus' of workers, but this does not determine how they are 'disposed 
of'. But, considered as a partial explanation, Morris' suggestion does 
have some merit. 
- 2 3 / . 
It may be supplemented by observing that a further 'surplus' has been and is 
being created by the changing nature of South African capitalism in general -
increased capital intensity, the growth of moinopoly capitalism and the 
increasing importance of manufacturing. It is these people who constitute 
the 'reserve army of labour'; in part they are being organised into a cheap 
labour supply for border industries by resettlement in townships within 
commuting distance of these. Their cheapness is assured by t ieir supply 
outstripping the still small demand for labour in border industries, their 
powerlessness and by the lack of legislative protection for people working 
in the border industries. 
So it is reasonable to argue that the form of production in industry and 
agriculture in South Africa 'necessitates' a large proportion of the removals. 
It cannot account for the whole process, however, as the Limehill case 
demonstrates. The removals (from Maria Ratschitz) were not necessitated 
by the capitalisation of agriculture, since the people were located on 
mission land (still partly occupied by 50 families) where farming activities 
continue in the same way as they have gone on for decades. Neither are the 
people at Limehill a source of cheap labour, not even potentially. We have 
already noted their position in relation to border industries and the 
unlikelihood of their finding employment there. The urban areas have their 
own reserve army of labour and there is no reason for the residents of such 
settlements being able to compete more cheaply. 
Such people, therefore, can only be described as the subjects of marginalisation, 
which 'occurs as a by-product of the process of proletarianisation, i.e. 
the process of separating producers from their means of production and 
commoditising their labour power. Thus while the development and extension 
of capitalist relations frees agents from their means of production, it leaves 
a proportion of these without any possibility of functioning in capitalist 
production'
 2 7
. A necessary condition for the occurrence of marginalisation 
is the existence of large labour surpluses; this condition has been shown 
to hold in South Africa
 2 8
. The evidence which justifies the introduction 
of the concept of marginalisation has already been discussed - the fact that 
places like Limehill are far from places of employment while providing no 
opportunities for subsistence agriculture, the extremely limited opportunities 
for work offered by the local labour bureau (which seems to serve as a means 
for blocking legal employment search) and the high rates of unemployment 
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among the young and among women workers. Here, then, there is no question 
of simply controlling a labour force; it is a matter of controlling all the 
people. Perhaps that is why they need three police forces! 
Thus far, the limitations of existing explanations of the resettlement 
policy have been pointed out. A more comprehensive account should, in my 
view, start from the observation that the policy is an obviov , example of the 
extra-economic coercion which Legassick points out is chai acteristic of South 
African capitalism
 2 9
. But Legassick does not tell us why such coercion is 
used. He does not explain, for example, why the Progressives (also committed 
to capitalism) do not advocate the same forms and degree of extra-economic 
coercion and in particular why they have opposed forced removals. 
The reason must lie in the greater dependence of some sections of South African 
capitalism and their supporting classes than others on existing political 
arrangements for the furtherance of their interests. Certain sections of 
Afrikaner business have been greatly expanded under state patronage since 1948 
and agrarian capital benefits from a whole series of state interventions in 
agricultural markets. The position of white labour, too, is directly bolstered 
by state measures of various kinds. 
The growth of mass-based African political power would undoubtedly limit the 
ability of the state to maintain its support of these interests. By contrast, 
other sections of capital can entertain a greater range of political alternatives 
(including those which involve a growth of African political power) in the 
confidence that they will still have the means to advance their interests. 
In other words, there are differing interests in the extent and form of political 
control over Africans,the Nationalist state being committed to a particularly 
complete form. 
Virtually all forms of resettlement subject the people moved more or less 
directly to greater political control. For example, people moved to Limehill 
now fall under the authority of chiefs which they did not in their former 
places
 3 0
. People removed from urban areas are prevented from organising 
political struggle there, where it would be most effective. People moving 
into townships supplying labour to border industries are removed from the scope 
of such legislation as exists, limiting super-exploitation, and people 
removed as a result of betterment schemes suffer as a result of the creation 
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of a class of which at least the more affluent part can be expected to 
support 'homeland governments' to which the state is delegating some of the 
control functions. 
Such an extension of control has its origins in the dominance ">f the particular 
sections of South African capital which require complete exclusion of mass-
based African political influence. This is not quite the same as saying, 
with Baldwin, that at one level the reason lies in the pursuit of an 
ideological goal. This implies that ideological and economic factors operate 
independently; however, racial separation is not in itself in the interests 
of whites, but only if such separation meets the demands of capitalism. 
Ideology, in other words, is not independent of economic interests. Then 
again, this is not to say that ideological factors (of the most irrational 
kind) are not sometimes at work. Why, for example, are people moved simply 
from one side of the road to the other, or, even in extreme cases, forced 
to pull down their houses and rebuild them five yards away? 
The resettlement policy, therefore, is not on the one hand, the work of 
demented racists. Nor, on the other, is it simply a result of the development 
of production on the dominant sectors of the economy. Rather, it is a complex, 
comprehensive and effective way of exercising political control, arising from 
the present form of South African capitalism as a whole. 
VIII SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
The principle conclusions of this study may be summarised as follows: 
(a) The Limehill resettlement was one type of forced removal (a removal 
from 'white' rural areas which results from the elimination of squatting 
and labour tenancies on white farms into a 'closer settlement'); there are 
a number of other types, serving rather different purposes. 
(b) Facilities at Limehill remain rudimentary. There is a Bantu Affairs 
Department office, a water supply (with one tap for every 35 families), 
corrugated iron privies served by a bucket system, two overcrowded primary 
schools (shared with other settlements), a clinic (without a telephone), 
two general dealers arid one cafe/store (where prices are higher than in 
town) and three churches. Internal roads are in poor repair. The majority 
of houses are made of mud and thatch and many are delapidated being 
exposed to wind and rain and termites. 
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(c) About 20% of the children born at Limehill have not survived to the date 
of the survey. It addition, it appears that the birthrate has dropped and 
the rate of population growth is about half the average rate among Africans. 
Possible explanations are that deaths at birth or shortly thereafter were 
not mentioned by respondents and that, in a context where family planning 
services are available and wellpublicised, people may choose tn practise 
birth control in view of their impoverished conditions. 
(d) Unemployment rates are high even by contemporary South African standards; 
in particular, very few adult women are in wage employment. The rate of 
unemployment among young adults is also particularly high; many of the 15-19 
age group and some of the 20-24 age group probably stay on at school because 
of the poor prospects of f i l i n g a job. Distance from places of possible 
employment and discouragement in finding work at the nearest labour bureau 
make things difficult for new entrants into the labour force. We may speak 
of the Limehill population as 'marginalised' as there appears to be no formal 
sector of the economy which requires its labour. 
(e) There is a general feeling of hopelessness amongst the residents of 
Limehill. Virtually no-one believes that he participates in decision-making; 
few believe that becoming part of Kwazulu has made any difference to their 
lives. Unemployment and poverty with attendant social disorder were most 
frequently mentioned as problems; the great majority did not believe that it 
is possible to make any progress towards solving these problems. A small 
number of respondents rated life at Limehill good or fair, but the vast 
majority said it was a place of suffering and difficult to live in or that 
they were more deprived there than formerly. Some also mentioned social 
disintegration. Over four-fifths of the respondents would return to the places 
they came from, chiefly because they had had land and cattle and were more 
prosperous, not having to rely on cash income for everything. 
(f) The task of explaining all aspects of resettlement policy is not one 
that has been much or satisfactorily attempted in the past. It is clear, 
however, that an explanation wholly in terms of ideological factors, as is an 
explanation only in terms of the development of production in the dominant 
sectors of the economy, is inadequate. Rather, it appears that resettlement 
is a complex, comprehensive and effective way of exercising political control 
arising from the recent development of South African capitalism as a whole. 
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